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 Common sense is a fraught political term appropriated for a variety of ends by a variety of 
actors, in both political theory and in more concrete political life. It is used across the political 
spectrum: from conservatives in New Jersey and Australia who rally for tax cuts beneath the banner 
‘Common Sense Conservatism’ to left-wing environmental activists who demand support for 
‘common sense’ climate change policies. A year ago, a particularly striking example of the use of 
‘common sense’ in politics appeared. A group of House Democrats led by Representatives John 
Lewis and Katherine Clark conducted a sit-in on the floor of Congress – the first in the body’s 
history. Their demand was for what they called ‘common sense gun reform’: they proposed banning 
members of the FBI’s no-fly list from buying assault weapons. For Lewis and Clark, the radicalism 
of their unprecedented action was justified by the common sense nature of their proposal. In the 
climactic paragraph of his statement on the sit-in, Lewis said, “we have a mission, an obligation, and 
a mandate. History will not be kind if Congress continues to turn a blind eye and a cold shoulder to 
those crying, begging, and pleading for action. We must pass common sense legislation to prevent 
gun violence and mass shootings in our country, and we must act now. Not next week, or next year, 
but now” (Lewis, 2016). On a political terrain largely determined by how little Republicans and 
Democrats have in common, the function of the phrase ‘common sense’ here was to point to their 
last shred of ostensibly shared values. No matter that no one on the FBI no-fly list had ever been 
implicated in a mass shooting and that the ‘common sense’ legislation proposed by Lewis and Clark 
would thus have no impact on the problem they claimed to be addressing. ‘Common sense’ was 
perceived as a reservoir of agreement that could be called upon to bring legislators together in 
moments of even extreme disagreement. And yet, rather than receive a vote on their ostensibly 
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common sense bill, Lewis and Clark’s sit-in barely made headlines and is largely forgotten a year 
later.    
This paper begins from a different premise: that the moment at which we are doing politics 
is the moment when we have no reservoir of agreement to draw upon and use to reach consensus. 
Instead, politics is a matter of dealing with what I call radical disagreement. Following Jacques Rancière, 
I argue that radical disagreement does not simply denote contestations over policy.  It identifies a 
situation in which the parties cannot agree on what the object of disagreement is, or even who 
counts as a party.  Deployments of ‘common sense’ that seek to use the term to identify a shared 
foundation for dialogue in order to reach consensus only disguise such disagreement. What then, are 
we to do with common sense in politics? I argue that Thomas Paine’s use of ‘common sense’ 
provides us with a historical model of an idiosyncratic understanding of common sense that is 
formulated to operate within a situation constituted by radical disagreement. This interpretation flies 
in the face of others that read Paine in the social contract tradition. Instead I argue that for Paine 
writing in 1776, the disagreement between America and Britain is radical, and Paine’s common sense 
demands of his readers that they confront how radical the disagreement is: there are those with 
common sense who recognize the correctness of the American cause, and those with prejudice who 
do not. Paine’s common sense thus works topographically to demarcate the line of radical 
disagreement that constitutes the political situation, and does not seek to justify political decisions by 
appealing to a common sense that would refer to an already agreed upon consensus that underpins 
and provides a foundation for the political situation.  
This paper will first identify a tradition of political thought that uses common sense to cover 
up and avoid the possibility of radical disagreement. I implicate John Rawls’s use of ‘intuition’ and 
Arendt’s use of ‘common sense’ in this tradition, and trace its historical origins to ordinary language 
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uses of the term common sense in 18th century English politics. I argue that, as a whole, this 
tradition uses common sense as a reservoir of pre-given agreement and consensus which can be 
drawn upon to re-establish agreement. This traditional use of common sense is thus blind to the 
possibility of what I’ve termed radical disagreement: that some situations emerge – following 
Rancière, we may even call them the essentially political situations– where parties cannot agree on 
the object of dispute or even who the parties are, and no shared foundation of agreement pre-exists 
the dispute and ensures that consensus is possible.  
I argue Paine can be read as an ancestor of contemporary radical democratic theory instead 
of a member of the social contract tradition. Paine’s common sense does not serve to identify a 
point of agreement that precedes politics: instead, Paine’s common sense is a topographical tool that 
demarcates the line of radical disagreement running through his political situation. On one side of 
this line are those with common sense who understand the need for American independence; on the 
other side are the prejudiced, who believe reconciliation between Britain and America is possible. 
However, Paine’s common sense does not simply serve to indicate this disagreement - it also works 
as a partisan weapon in favor of his side of the disagreement. Paine’s political theory is a tool of 
political practice. Paine is thus an antecedent both to Rancière, whose notion of “dissensus” (1999, 
2001) usefully captures the notion of politics under the conditions of radical disagreement, and 
Louis Althusser, whose middle work on the political practice of Machiavelli (2011) shares with Paine 






II: A Tradition of Common Sense 
 The term ‘common sense’ is a term widely used in ordinary language to refer to a putatively 
universal basic standard of judgment; if a proposal “lacks common sense” it is somehow out of joint 
with the prevailing, or folkish, understanding of how a problem ought to be solved. In ordinary 
language,  ‘common sense’ also refers to a substantial and generalized body of knowledge shared by 
a community.  This distinction has its roots in the phrase’s etymology: the English ‘common sense’ 
comes from the Latin sensus communis, which was a synthesis of three distinct Greek terms: koinos 
nous, and koine aisthesis, referred to faculties of judgment, and a third, koinos ennoia referred to a body 
of folk knowledge (Holton, 1997: 38). A broad array of historical and contemporary political 
theorists have employed both dimensions of common sense. For both Hannah Arendt and John 
Rawls, theorists who prima facie share very little in their systems of political thought, this traditional 
use of common sense provides the foundation upon which political discourse becomes possible.  
 John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) was widely hailed as re-opening the question of 
substantive political philosophy in the Anglophone academy (Douglass, 2012: 84). Rawls investigates 
how to come to a shared notion of justice when people hold contradictory intuitions  – the 
privileged example being a presumed contradiction between individual liberty and the common 
good.  In line with ordinary language uses of common sense, Rawls uses the term “intuition” both to 
refer to a basic and universal faculty of judgment that contrasts with reason and to a pre-given set of 
observed data (Rawls, 1999: 19; Shaw, 1980: 127-8). Rawls develops two key tools to solve the 
problem of contradictory intuitions: the original position and the reflective equilibrium. Rawls’s 
original position is a hypothetical starting point for political dialogue in which people reach 
consensus over what political association ought to look like without knowing their particular place 
within that political association. They place themselves behind a “veil of ignorance” and bring with 
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them only those faculties and understandings of the world that are general to all men: intuitions. To 
address conflicting intuitions, Rawls introduces his concept of a reflective equilibrium that reconciles 
contradictory intuited values and maximizes each as far as possible (Rawls, 1999: 18; Hart, 1983: 
241). A balanced consensus is the end of politics for Rawls – both its aim and its exhaustion. It is a 
maximization of the implications of the principles agreed upon by political interlocutors behind the 
veil of ignorance. The extent to which intuitions can be made to agree is relied upon to moderate the 
extent to which they disagree: thus, Rawls’s version of common sense becomes a tool to moderate 
political dialogue and provide it with a foundation predicated upon agreement. 
A particular understanding of the relationship between practice and theory follows from this 
conceptualization of politics. For Rawls, “public political culture” is looked to as a “shared fund of 
implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles.” The political philosopher then “must find a new 
way of organizing familiar ideas and principles into a conception of political justice so that the claims 
in conflict, as previously understood, are seen in another light” (Rawls, 1985: 229-230). Rawls 
understands the political philosopher as drawing upon shared points of agreement – the reservoirs 
of common sense – to bring disagreeing parties together in a consensus around what the just 
government looks like. The community is not constituted by anything like radical disagreement, but 
by what it has in common and the edifice of consensus it is able to construct upon that more basic, 
already given, agreement. Like the social contract tradition that he inherits, Rawls thinks the role of 
political philosophy is to produce an agreed upon norm for the legitimacy of government. 
 In Rawls’s hands intuition evacuates politics of disagreement. H.L. Hare indicts Rawls’s 
system because it depends on some prior shared intuitions that interlocutors bring to the original 
position. If those intuitions are not already shared and can’t be balanced to some extent, Rawls’s 
system provides no way to decide between them. For example, if one interlocutor intuits non-
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human animal life as a subject with rights and another does not, Rawls gives the interlocutors no 
tools to resolve this disagreement. On the other hand, when interlocutors come to the original 
position already broadly in agreement, the whole theory seems to provide a marginal service at best 
(Hare, 1973: 23). In a similar critique posed in slightly different terms, Raymond Geuss argues that 
Rawls evacuates politics of disagreement by relying on an intuitional and shared understanding of 
the content of justice and its priority over other values (Geuss, 2008: 72-3). Benjamin Barber argues 
that Rawls’s formula assumes that individual freedom and the common good would necessarily be in 
contradiction, which covers up the radical Marxist contention that this contradiction is contingent 
and produced by the particular historical arrangements of capitalism (Barber, 1975: 668). The 
disagreement between the Marxist position and Rawls’s is radical and cannot be hashed out using 
the tools of the original position and reflective equilibrium. At the moment when radical 
disagreement appears Rawls’s common sense fails to function and cannot produce a consensus. 
 The limits of this tradition of using common sense as a means to establish basic agreement 
and marginalize radical disagreement are also present in the political thought of Hannah Arendt. 
Arendt emphasizes a public/private distinction that finds its origins in Aristotle. The private realm 
or oikos is the realm of administered things (Arendt, 2012: 28). Within this realm, issues should be 
resolvable in principle by recourse to objective fact (Norris, 1996: 170). The public, political realm or 
polis is distinct from the rest of life because it is constituted by a plurality of perspectives. Thus, it 
needs a plural and shared, but also fundamentally stable epistemic authority to make space for 
different perspectives on the same objects.1 This is the role of common sense (Arendt, 2012: 209). It 
is not simply a pre-given foundation the political community operates upon as it is for Rawls, but 
nor is it simply constructed – instead it is a flexible and shared set of judgments and understandings 
                                                
1 Rosenfeld uses the term ‘epistemic authority’ to discuss the role played by common sense in 18th century Britain 
(Rosenfeld, 2008: 3). 
8 
about the world that are both produced by and the condition for public action and discourse. This 
flexibility is basically circular: common sense creates the conditions under which common sense can 
be discussed and modified. Without public activity common sense simply withers away and 
disappears, and without common sense, man loses the ability to participate in the properly political 
dimension of life (Hinchman, 1984: 325; Arendt, 2012: 284). 
 Arendt’s common sense, like Rawls’s, provides her with no tools to deal with the problem of 
radical disagreement. In both systems, common sense opens up only the possibility of a moderate 
critique, which can challenge the details, but not the paradigm, of a political proposal or argument. 
For both thinkers, common sense’s application as a political judgment relies upon a larger body of 
already shared and inherited knowledge, and critique based on common sense can indicate only 
marginal cases where the polity has acted out of line with that knowledge. Common sense is 
understood as a reservoir that can reliably be drawn upon to find areas of fundamental agreement. 
However, Arendt’s common sense is imagined to be flexible and dynamic: as the public dialogue 
that common sense enables occurs, that dialogue acts back on common sense and modifies it.2 For 
Rawls, on the other hand, intuitions are given preconditions for political dialogue. Even with the 
extra flexibility common sense is allotted in Arendt’s conceptualization, it still operates as a shared 
reservoir of agreement that is fundamental to the possibility of political community.3 Common sense 
can only evolve for Arendt based on resources it already provides, and thus perspectives radically out 
of joint with prevailing common sense cannot be made to appear in the public sphere.  
Disagreements over the object of disagreement or over who is allowed to discuss the disagreement – 
                                                
2 Interestingly, to the extent that Rawls’s process of reaching reflective equilibrium takes intuitions as axioms and 
to the extent that he understands his theory of justice as a moral algebra, he is practicing more or less what 
Arendt labels as “ideology”, the totalitarian inversion of common sense. 
3 For an argument that Arendt’s common sense is an effort to avoid constituting the political community on a 
common substance, see Norris “Arendt, Kant, and the Politics of Common Sense.” 
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disagreements I have termed radical, which break with existing paradigms of political thinking - are 
beyond the scope of Arendt’s common sense. As is the case for Rawls, Arendt’s concept of 
common sense is blind to the possibility of radical disagreement. 
 We can trace this conception of common sense as a mode of moderate critique that 
marginalizes radical disagreement back to 18th century England. In the wake of the English Civil 
War, the first half of the 18th century found the opposition to the English crown searching for 
rhetorical tools with which to limit and criticize the British Crown without fundamentally 
challenging its legitimacy. For the opposition, common sense referred to an innate faculty that 
produced generally agreed-upon judgments of ethics and taste in a way that anticipated Arendt’s 
notion of common sense (Rosenfeld, 2008: 8-13). The goal of this use of common sense was to find 
space for critique without allowing that critique to radicalize and re-open the possibility of civil war.  
Prominent works like the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’s “Sensus Communis: An Essay on the 
Freedom of Wit and Humor” reflected this use of common sense. Shaftesbury writes that  “we can 
never do more Injury to Truth, than by discovering too much of it, on some occasions” 
(Shafestbury, 1709: 41). Common sense for Shaftesbury and other members of the moderate 
opposition was used as a particularly English “bulwark” against threats of political excess coming 
from a number of directions: the monarchy, philosophical skepticism and cynicism, Catholicism, and 
France’s perceived outsized influence (Rosenfeld, 2008: 22). Political disagreements among these 
moderates always concerned exceptional cases that existed on the margins of political activity. 
Common sense oriented criticism toward already-existing consensus, rather than challenging the 
basis of that consensus all together. 
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 As ‘common sense’ gained political value, its substance – but not its form – was quickly 
contested by more radical4 elements of the opposition. In Henry Fielding’s play Pasquin ‘Queen 
Common Sense’ was pitted against  ‘Queen Ignorance’ and their struggle made common sense into a 
type of jury rendering subversive judgments on reigning opinion, including arguing for limitations 
on Royal authority (Fielding, 1736: 217-249). These more radical appropriators wanted to use 
common sense subversively and gained popularity doing so, culminating in the journal Common Sense; 
or, the Englishman’s Journal (1737-1743), which leveraged common sense in a manner similar to 
Fielding (Rosenfeld, 2008: 31-35). Now, ‘common sense’ was used to set increasingly extreme limits 
on the crown’s rights over the governed, and also provided a platform for a more radical call for 
“moral regeneration” (Rosenfeld, 2008: 33).  To counter this threat, conservatives argued that the 
opposition was misconstruing the substantial contents of common sense.  However, both the more 
radical opposition and their conservative opponents shared a conception of common sense’s formal 
structure – it always referred back to an already shared consensus, to a reservoir of agreement that 
can be drawn upon. The radical appropriators of common sense challenged its substance – the 
specific contents of that consensus – but not its form. To challenge the formal structure of common 
sense and deploy it without reference to a pre-existing consensus that precludes the possibility of 
radical disagreement, a very different politics and political theory are necessary. I find both in 









                                                
4 N.B. this is not the radicalism I associate with Paine further down.  
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III: Paine’s (Un)common Sense 
 
 Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was written in 1776, the year the American colonies stopped 
trying to reconcile their differences with Great Britain and declared independence. Paine’s pamphlet 
has been called the “efficient cause” for this change, and with sales estimated to have been 
somewhere between a hundred thousand and a million in a country of only three million, it is 
difficult to overstate the impact of the work (Ferguson, 2000: 465). Paine advances a slew of 
arguments in favor of independence: it is perverse for an island to rule a continent; William the 
Conqueror was a French bastard; hereditary monarchy was a Jewish sin. Amid this rhetorical 
onslaught, finding theoretical consistency in the work – that is, attempting to distill a consistent 
understanding of politics from the pamphlet – is a “frustrating” task (Ferguson, 2000: 469). I believe 
such reactions to Paine rest largely on a very selective reading of Common Sense that emphasize three 
pages of social contract theory over the rest of the document on the grounds that, as rhetoric, most 
of Common Sense does not qualify as genuine political philosophy. Paine’s document is seen as 
politically confused, even contradictory: dipping its toes in the eloquence of theory for three pages 
before letting loose an incendiary and decidedly nontheoretical howl that does not follow from its 
own theoretical premises.  This reading is used to integrate Paine into the social contract tradition, a 
tradition basically uninterested in thinking radical disagreement as constitutive of politics. Instead, I 
argue that Paine’s defense of common sense offers a coherent political philosophical argument. For 
Paine, common sense offers a topographically informed theoretical practice sensitive to the reality of 
radical disagreement. By this, I mean that Paine both conceptualizes what the practical function of 
theory is, and sets out to practice theory according to those criteria. Paine’s common sense is always 
opposed to prejudice, and he uses the former term to describe a particular stance on one side of a 
political disagreement that understands itself to be particular, but nonetheless claims to be universal. 
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That is, for Paine a common sense position is embedded within a political situation constituted by 
radical disagreement, realizes that disagreement will not disappear, but insists on the absolute 
correctness of its particular position nonetheless and then seeks to advance that position. 
Proceduralist norms of disagreement are abandoned in favor of a radical theoretical practice that 
understands itself as topographically embedded in a situation where Britain and America do not 
share any pre-given consensus with which to moderate their disagreement. 
 Many scholars have emphasized the contractarian arguments from which Paine begins as a 
key to understanding the theoretical outlook of the document.5 He draws a distinction between 
society and government: society is natural, “encourages intercourse” and pre-dates government 
while government is artificial, “creates distinctions” and is a “necessary evil...a badge of lost 
innocence” (Paine, 2000: 3). Paine’s story of man’s fall from society into government adopts a 
basically Lockean perspective from which a state-of-nature origin story determines the legitimacy of 
government. He views men as naturally good, but because of the chance of vice they must “establish 
some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue” (Paine, 2000: 4). Government is a 
necessary evil and any extension of democratic freedoms is synonymous with the maximization of 
the common good. Government is only legitimate when it fulfills its end of the contract that lead 
from society to government: the promotion of moral virtue and the happiness of the people. In the 
following pages Paine argues that English rule over America achieves neither goal.  
 The issue with this reading of Paine as a “vintage liberal” (Kramnick, 1990: 154) working 
within the social contract tradition is that it obscures the centrality of radical disagreement to Paine’s 
political theory.  Paine clearly does not understand himself as being engaged in a properly theoretical 
or philosophical debate about the legitimacy of English rule over the American colonies. He writes, 
                                                
5 See for instance Isaac Kramnick’s Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism (1990) or Eric Foner’s Tom Paine 
and Revolutionary America (2005).  
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“volumes have been written on the subject of the struggle between England and America. Men of all 
ranks have embarked in the controversy, from different motives, and with various designs; but all 
have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is closed” (Paine, 2000: 16). The point for Paine is 
not to produce another entry in the social contract debate over what legitimates (or delegitimizes) a 
monarch. The disagreement between England and the colonies will not be resolved on that terrain, 
and the end of Paine’s political theory is not internal to the theory, but justified in relation to its 
practical effects. The disagreement between England and the colonies exists within a situation where 
not only have British interests diverged from American interests but also one where Britain does not 
acknowledge America as a distinct nation with the possibility of having a distinct set of interests 
(Paine, 2000: 17).6  Thus, the disagreement is radical: the two sides disagree over what the object of 
their dispute is, who has a right to be counted as a subject within that dispute, and they do not share 
a vocabulary with which to resolve the dispute.7 As a consequence of this, England and America are 
already in an antagonistic relationship: those who believe reconciliation is still possible are 
“interested men, who are not to be trusted, weak men who cannot see, prejudiced men who will not 
see, and a certain set of moderate men who think better of the European world than it deserves” 
(Paine, 2000: 20-21). The disagreement between the two sides is disagreement over the terms of 
disagreement, over what objects have become and can become visible in the political terrain. Rather 
than try to resolve such a dispute by forging consensus and coming to a shared norm of what 
justifies the state (the contractual approach), Paine deploys common sense as a partisan weapon 
                                                
6 This disagreement is perhaps also at stake in the different understandings of representation on either side of the 
Atlantic. See Pitkin, 2013.  
7  Paine makes clear how central the problem of America not being recognized as a distinct subject is to his 
pamphlet in its second to last line: “Under our present denomination of British subjects, we can neither be 
received nor heard abroad; the custom of all Courts is against us, and will be so, until by an independence we 
take rank with other nations” (Paine, 2000: 41). Rancière calls this sort of disagreement “dissensus,” the essence 
of politics. As we will see, Rancière and Paine share an interest in using metaphors of visibility and invsibility 
to understand the stakes of politics.  
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from and for one side of that dispute. Only this strategy can hope to have a practical effect in a 
situation constituted by radical disagreement. 
 From this perspective, Paine’s early use of the vocabulary of the social contract was only a 
useful rhetorical strategy in his historical context. As Eric Foner (2005) argues, the language of 
Lockeanism was ubiquitous in the Anglo-American debate in Philadelphia in the early 1770s. Paine’s 
adoption of contractarian language was thus not a brief and derivative entry in the history of social 
contract theory. He appropriated it because it was useful. It did not give Paine an understanding of 
the terrain on which he was operating, and thus did not give him a topographical understanding of 
the political situation in which he was intervening and the effects his theory could hope to have 
upon that terrain – only his most important weapon, common sense, could provide him with that. 
 David Hoffman offers an account of Paine’s common sense as a topographical tool of the 
rhetorician. He describes Paine’s use of common sense and prejudice as a strategy to challenge not 
just specific details of Anglo-American relations, but the entire “perceptual frame” within which 
those details were grasped (Hoffman, 2006: 392).8 Paine uses ‘prejudice’ to bracket a whole point of 
view about the future of relations with Britain – namely, the belief that peaceful reconciliation is 
possible – and contrasts that bracket of views with his own, indicated by the term common sense. 
The two perceptual frames do not share a vocabulary and are not in dialogue with one another – 
they are separated by a break, and the terms prejudice and common sense are used to demarcate the 
line of that break. On Hoffman’s account, common sense is used as a topographical tool, which 
indicates the position of the disagreement between Paine and those who believe reconciliation with 
England is possible. In the last instance for Hoffman however, Paine’s ‘common sense’ is ultimately 
contradictory: “why was the view that America could not hope to defeat the British navy, the best in 
                                                
8 I just want to (marginally) note again the shared metaphors of visibility that inform this understanding of 
politics.  
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the world at the time, a product of prejudice, while the notion that an island could not rule a 
continent, when the vast Roman empire was ruled by a tiny city-state, common sense” (Hoffman, 
2006: 398)? From this perspective, Paine’s common sense signals a need not, as the contractarians 
believe, to come to new and shared norms of the legitimacy of government, but to break radically 
with the entire paradigm of thought governing Anglo-American relations. This use of common 
sense is a sharp break from the form of common sense used in 18th century Britain. Instead of 
referring back to an already existing consensus to legitimate critique, common sense now demarcates 
lines of disagreement and the need to abandon the hope of finding a shared vocabulary. However, 
Hoffman believes that much of the substance of Paine’s common sense, the discrete set of rhetorical 
claims advanced in Common Sense are incoherent and thus, Hoffman claims, not common-sensical at 
all. Hoffman is unwilling to allow the formal function of common sense – as signaling the need for a 
paradigm shift along a certain demarcated line of disagreement – to modulate its substantial content. 
He is only willing to meet Paine partway.  
 Sophia Rosenfeld offers a second, historically grounded account of Paine’s idiosyncratic 
break with existing uses of common sense. Rosenfeld describes two alternative 18th century 
traditions of common sense: one, the Scottish Realist School and in particular the work of Thomas 
Reid, who saw common sense as a response to Humean skepticism, a set of general intuitions that 
reinforce belief in the existing world, and its political, scientific and religious institutions.9 Common 
sense for Reid effectively operates in a manner philosophically analogous to its political uses in 
England during the same period: it refers back to the stable and already-given consensus and limits 
skeptical challenges to the status quo.  Further, this status quo common sense is defined in part by 
its robust simplicity and obviousness as a folk knowledge shared by all (Rosenfeld, 2008: 643-8). In 
                                                
9 For a complete recounting of Paine’s lifelong historical involvement in Enlightenment culture from London to 
Philadelphia, see Eric Foner’s Thomas Paine and Revolutionary America. 
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contrast, the French and Dutch traditions of bons sens invoke a particular type of common sense not 
general to the population but the possession of a handful of enlightened elites that they used to 
criticize existing traditions as irrational. Rather than being common in the sense of general and 
accessible to the entire population, bons sens is a tool of elite critique. And rather than referring to a 
pre-given simplicity, bons sense is only accessible as a result of enlightened education (Rosenfeld, 
2008: 654-7). For Rosenfeld, Paine synthesizes these two traditions. Contra the continental bons sens 
school and with Reid, common sense is in principle accessible to all, but contra Reid and with 
continental bons sens, Paine’s common sense is a tool of critique and not a support for existing 
orthodoxy. In her historically minded approach, Rosenfeld identifies a puzzle internal to Paine’s 
common sense: He ostensibly refers back to an already existing consensus about what ought to be 
done with regard to Anglo-American relations while arguing that this consensus is in radical 
disagreement with the status quo – and thus not a substantive consensus that pre-exists his pamphlet 
at all. 
 Rather than synthesizing these traditions in an incomplete and contradictory way (as 
Rosenfeld implies), I understand Paine as appropriating aspects of each for use at his particular 
historical moment. Paine is perfectly aware that the common sense he is advocating is not yet 
‘common’ in the sense of being a broad consensus that pre-existed his pamphlet, which opens: 
“Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to 
procure them general favor” (Paine, 2000: 2). Instead, Paine anticipates a common sense that is on 
the verge of arrival, and ends the first paragraph of his introduction with the observation that “time 
makes more converts than reason” (Paine, 2000: 2). Paine’s common sense will become common 
only if his reader will “divest himself of prejudice and prepossession and suffer his reason and his 
feelings to determine for themselves” (Paine, 2000: 16). The conclusion that American 
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independence is now necessary is available to all only on the condition prejudice is first put aside. 
Paine’s common sense is common because it is accessible to the popular mass, not because it refers to 
a pre-given consensus. Rosenfeld’s paradox is resolved: Paine understood common sense as a tool 
of critique in the sense that it was not yet fashionable, but had the potential to become so. It is both 
critical and popular. 
 This notion of a critical and popular common sense as a horizon is broadly resonant with 
Hoffman’s understanding of Paine’s challenge to the prejudicial perceptual frame through which 
Anglo-American relations were understood in his time. But Hoffman objects that even if common 
sense plays some role in demarcating a line of radical disagreement (or in his language, bracketing 
perceptual frames), the substance of Paine’s common sense is basically arbitrary: it is not shored up 
by a relation of correspondence to an empirical referent, and so, Hoffman claims, Paine claims 
whatever he wants is common sense.  This is wrong on at least two counts. First, Paine’s common 
sense is intrinsically simple and populist in nature. In contrast to prejudice, common sense has a 
substantive predisposition towards democracy. Common sense is common not because it is already 
general but because it is accessible; Paine’s centering of common sense amounts to a centering of 
the masses and the form of government that is best suited to them: democracy. Support for the 
English monarch based on prejudice is facilitated by the English constitution’s complexity (Paine, 
2000: 5, 8). A return to common sense in government means a return to a government that can be 
understood by the masses, and thus a return to a simple constitution, the bare-bone outlines of 
which Paine details (Paine, 2000: 26). Central to Paine’s proposed constitution is his demand for a 
unicameral legislature, a demand which would ultimately go unsatisfied and which would draw the 
ire of John Adams, who viewed Paine as a crass populist, a characterization Paine would probably 
agree with. For Paine, democracy is simple: it just involves a space for the representatives of the 
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people to assemble and pass laws, with the basic rights necessary for their assemblage protected in 
what he calls a “charter” (Paine, 2000: 40). In essence then, Paine saw simplicity in governance – and 
thus a government in tune with common sense – as inextricably linked to a democratic populism.  
 But Paine’s Common Sense is not a general theory of democratic government defending it on 
the grounds of its simplicity: it is a pamphlet meant to help secure American independence and 
democracy at a particular historical moment. In the closing pages of the pamphlet, Paine describes 
why the particularities of the American situation in 1776—from the right population density to the 
abundance of lumber—makes independence common sense (Paine, 2000: 31-34). Thus “the present 
time, likewise, is that peculiar time which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of 
forming itself into a government” (Paine, 2000: 35). America is a particular positioned to achieve a 
universal cause, a logic that stretches from the introduction of Common Sense to its final page: “the 
cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all mankind. Many circumstance have, and will 
arise, which are not local but universal” (Paine, 2000: 2). There is a twisting logic here: Paine begins 
the sentence by naming a particular locality, America, and ends it by concluding that this is not a 
particular at all, but a universal. Rather than trying to resolve the tension between 
particular/universal in a gesture towards their ultimate conformity (as Rawls attempts to with his 
reflective equilibrium), Paine takes this tension as a condition of the situation Common Sense is 
operating within – it is not a document directed towards demonstrating the universal necessity of 
particular situations giving way to universals, but of showing how the contingent particularities of 
America’s situation will give rise to a universal.10  
                                                
10    In this sense, Paine wants common sense to be both particular and universal. He anticipates Ernesto Laclau’s 
formulation of this logic: “The conclusion seems to be that universality is incommensurable with any particularity 
yet cannot exist apart from the particular. How is this relation possible? This paradox cannot be solved, but its 
insolubility is the very precondition of democracy” (Laclau 1992, 90). Laclau understands this impossibility to mean 
that politics will always be the claim of a particular to be the universal, and democracy is the regime that realizes the 
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Paine’s common sense, conditioned by being the particular common sense of the American 
masses, necessarily has substantively populist democratic content. However, the core of Hoffman’s 
empirical complaint still remains: under what conception of common sense could it possibly be 
common- sensical that the non-existent American navy could defeat the globally hegemonic British 
navy? Paine clearly thinks that belief in the coming American victory is as common-sensical as the 
simplicity of the democratic constitution that will be implemented after the war. Paine also imagines 
common sense as an intrinsically populist weapon used on one side of a radical disagreement. The 
formal function of Paine’s common sense is to demarcate the lines of a radical disagreement, and 
contend that one side of this argument, a particular, is predisposed to becoming universal. But 
common sense does not operate simply for this side of the disagreement – it operates from that 
particular position. Paine presents as common- sensical what must be common sense in order for the 
separation between America and Britain to take place and for America to become independent. 
Paine allows practice to modulate his theory (instead of attempting to develop a theory that will 
govern practice) and thus understands his work as theoretical practice, a weapon deployed in a 
terrain constituted by radical disagreement, and writes accordingly.  
 Reading beyond the putative contractrianism of Paine’s document allows a much more 
radical figure to emerge. Paine developed an understanding of the relationship between theory and 
practice conditioned by disagreement that prima facie contradicts social contract notions of practice. 
This new understanding of the theory/practice relationship is facilitated by his use of common 
sense. Paine understands his situation as constituted by radical disagreement between Britain and 
America over the question of whether American and British interests can and have diverged. Given 
the centrality of this radical disagreement to the political situation, theoretical arguments that draw 
                                                                                                                                                       
possibility of making such a paradoxical claim. Paine’s notion of common sense is similar: it is a universal 
conditioned by a particularity, a universality always because of its particularity.  
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on supposedly shared norms of legitimacy that govern the English monarch do not function: instead 
of finding a public eager to engage in debate over the rights and responsibilities of the sovereign and 
the governed, Paine finds two sides in radical disagreement and lacking a shared vocabulary in which 
to discuss the issue. To make theory work, to make theory practice, the radical nature of the 
disagreement between America and England has to be taken as its condition.  
 This radical, agonistic approach to political theory is in sharp contrast with liberals like 
Rawls, for whom the practical role of political philosophy is to find common ground in the face of 
even the deepest disagreements. Paine is not attempting to produce a consensual and agreed upon 
norm for the legitimacy of government. Instead, he believes that there is no shared vocabulary with 
which to discuss foundational and agreed upon norms of legitimacy – politics must be done in a 
situation constituted by radical disagreement where the interlocutors do not share a vocabulary. 
Paine’s use of common sense is a strategy to carry out politics in light of this radical disagreement, 
and instead of attempting to immanently resolve disagreement, Paine attempts to practice politics 
with a common sense that does not need a reservoir of agreement between political parties to 
function.  
 
IV: Disagreement and Radical Democracy 
 Norm Jacobson has written that the American Revolution had “two varieties of political 
thought” at its origin. One, Paine’s, was “unsystematic in temper” and emphasized spontaneity and 
the possibility of “friendship and brotherhood.” The other, James Madison’s, had a “preoccupation 
with procedural rationality.” Madison won the day and his way of thinking was enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution (Jacobson, 1963: 561). With Jacobson, I see Paine as offering up a radical alternative to 
liberal political thought. However, most political theoretical studies of Paine interpret his work 
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through a lens developed by Quentin Skinner, in which Paine is read either as a liberal who sees no 
contradiction between the common good and individual liberty, or as a republican who does see a 
contradiction between the two and thus advocates for some participatory norm of citizenship.11 This 
debate tends to emphasize the contractarian opening of Common Sense at the expense of the rest of 
the document, where Paine re-modulates the relationship between theory and practice and produces 
a politics centered on disagreement. The bulk of the pamphlet is dismissed as “rage” or rhetoric that 
is of no theoretical value.12 Re-reading Paine outside of this republican-liberal paradigm reveals a 
much more radical thinker at the origins of the American Revolution.  
 My reading of Paine’s common sense as a topographical tool that demarcates disagreement 
and then mobilizes politics within the context of that disagreement makes him an unlikely 
predecessor of the radical democratic theorist Jacques Rancière. Rancière’s notion of “dissensus”  
(1999, 2001) shares a similar topography with Paine’s common sense. Since Paine understands 
himself not just as articulating a political topography but as acting within that topography as a 
theorist of politics, he also anticipates Louis Althusser’s understanding of political practice as it is 
formulated in his 1972 lectures on Machiavelli (2011), and his revised understanding of Marx’s 
materialism presented in Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Sciences (2012), a collection of 
                                                
11 See e.g. the Cambridge selections edited by Bruce Kuklick, Paine: Political Writings, xviii, or Isaac Kramnick 
Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism, 147 or Eric Foner Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, 87-89 for 
readings of Paine as a liberal. Other contemporary works that do not read Paine as a liberal often read him as a 
republican who does see a contradiction between the common good and individual liberty, e.g. Gregory Claeys 
Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought, 47, 86-88. It’s worth noting that Kramnick is not a member of the 
Cambridge School – see Pocock’s scathing review of the aforementioned book citation? – but that does not 
prohibit him from participating in its discursive paradigm.  
12 See for instance Kramnick, 151 where Kramnick explicitly contrasts Common Sense’s rational arguments for a 
“vintage liberalism” with the rest of the document’s “rage”, or Pockock Virtue, Commerce, and History 276, 
description of Paine as a contradictory thinker.  
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Althusser’s writings from 1965 to 1978.13  In short, in my reading Paine becomes an ancestor of 
contemporary radical democratic thought 
 For Rancière, politics is the making countable of what was previously uncountable. Politics 
refers to what Rancière calls “subjectification” or a specific mode of emergence of a new subject 
(Rancière, 2008: 35). The subject of politics is a “specific figure of the count of the uncounted or of 
the part of those without part” (Rancière, 2015: 43). The introduction of this subject, which has no 
identity or direct precedent in the community, creates a situation of radical disagreement because it 
means “political conflict does not involve an opposition between groups with different interests. It 
forms an opposition between logics that count the parties and parts of the community in different 
ways” (Rancière, 2015: 43). This “making visible that which had no reason to be seen” is the essence 
of politics and what Rancière calls “dissensus” (Rancière, 2015: 46).  Rancière contrasts the political 
with what he calls the “police”, whose “essence lies in a certain way of dividing up the sensible” 
(Rancière, 2015: 44). The police is an ordering of what can be counted in a given distribution. 
Historically, Rancière considers the revolt of the Aventine plebs to be an example of the staging of 
dissensus. The Aventine plebs transgressed existing norms that governed the distribution of the 
sensible (the police) by adopting the practices of the patricians (e.g. by consulting an oracle) and as a 
result, disrupted the logic of countability that governed the situation and presented themselves as a 
new political subject dis-identified with the current police order (Rancière, 1999: 24-5). 
Topographically then, politics is the rupture of a given police order of dividing up the sensible by 
the assertion of a new logic of what is visible. The political subject emerges as that which was 
invisible in the police order, and which confronts the police order with the paradoxical demand to 
                                                
13 The periodization is important here: I draw on the work of the ‘middle’ Althusser, post-May ‘68, an Althusser 
who has criticized the position he assumed on theory’s relationship to practice in the ‘60s in his better known 
works For Marx (1965) and Reading Capital (1965).  
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count the previously uncountable. Politics thus amounts to “the construction of a paradoxical world 
that puts together two separate worlds” and is constituted by radical disagreement (Rancière, 2015: 
47).  
 Like Paine, Rancière has laid out a formalistic or ‘topographic’ approach to understanding 
politics. As we asked of Paine, does Rancière’s notion of the political imply any necessary 
substantive and normative content, or is its content arbitrary? Does Rancière create as much space 
for a fascist subjectification (e.g. the Aryan people as the part who have no part in some 
cosmopolitan order) as he does for a leftist subjectification (e.g. the proletariat as the part who have 
no part in a capitalist order)? In a word, no. Like Paine, Rancière associates his concept of the 
political with democracy, which “is not a political regime” but rather “the specific situation in which 
it is the absence of entitlement that entitles one to exercise the arkhê ” (Rancière, 2008: 39). 14 In a 
properly political situation then, the subject who emerges is the one who previously had no 
entitlement to govern. Fascism on the other hand, imagines “a world cleansed of surplus identities” 
where the arkhê is governed only by pre-existing identities – that of the “ethnos” or ethnic people. 
Rancière’s political is a situation in which a disempowered mass who previously was not entitled to 
govern asserts their right to govern.  
 Paine’s pamphlet stages this political rupture with the police logic of countability that existed 
in 1776 colonial America. The break between common sense and prejudice is conditioned by a 
disagreement over whether it is possible for American interests to be distinct from British interests –
in Rancière’s terms, whether the subjectification of America and America’s dis-identification from 
                                                
14 Arkhê is a complicated term, originally from the Greek. For a prolonged conversation on its meaning, see 
Rancière’s Disagreement: Philosophy and Politics (2008). Briefly and crudely put, arkhê refers both to the 
commencement of a polis and to a determination of what will follow within the polis. It is a kind of stage that 
governs the play of appearances upon it.  
24 
Great Britain is possible.15  Paine’s common sense thus effects the arrival of Rancière’s political: it is 
no longer a question of how well a given order operates, but a question of what is allowed to count 
within that order and the introduction of America as the part which has no part. Like the Aventine 
plebs consulting an oracle, Paine argued that America had to establish embassies in foreign nations 
and declare independence, and present themselves in the international community as Britain’s equal. 
The possibility of ‘mutual’ understanding is not pre-given because the parties that would mutually 
understand one another are themselves the object of the dispute. Paine’s pamphlet is the 
“construction of a paradoxical world that puts together two separate worlds”: within it, prejudice is 
not immanently challenged as self-contradictory, but posed as a separate world from common sense, 
and the text puts the two heterogeneous logics on the same stage. Despite the internal consistency 
of prejudice, common sense and America’s cause are nonetheless paradoxically portrayed as the 
universal and correct side of the political dispute. Paine takes this paradox of radical disagreement as 
the starting point for his text. 
 Again similar to Rancière, Paine’s common sense and the political subjectification he carries 
out has a necessarily populist bent. Common sense constitutes a political subject who is capable of 
governing (of controlling the arkhê) but has been prevented from doing so for a number of reasons, 
including the complexity of government. By simplifying government, the new American regime 
(with its unicameral legislature) will make visible a particular new part that previously had no part: 
the American people. ‘America’ in Paine’s text is not an ethnos because America refers to a nation 
that did not count as a subject when Paine was writing. Rather than predicate the right to 
                                                
15 Interestingly, the two sides’ disagreement over virtual and real representation, is reflected in this: does the 
Crown count as a representative of America, or is America distinct from the Crown and thus in need of distinct 
representation? In short, Britain and the colonies “both understand and do not understand the same thing by the 
same words” (Rancière, 2008: xi).  
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government upon a pre-existing identity, Paine’s Common Sense demands that a new subject—
America—be provided with the stage on which to present itself.  
 There is a final benefit to reading Paine with Rancière. In Rancière’s texts, politics ruptures a 
given police, but Rancière offers no hints to help us predict the location of this rupture, or 
demarcate it topographically.16 This is precisely what Paine attempts to accomplish with his common 
sense. Rancière gives us terms to describe a partition of the sensible (police) and a term for the 
rupture within that partition (politics). He does not, however, give us terms to topographically and in 
an embedded way, demarcate the lines of ensuing disagreement. My wager is that Paine’s common 
sense and prejudice can serve as these terms. Translating Rancière’s discourse into Paine’s, it thus 
becomes the prejudicial (and anti-political) view to deny the existence of the rupturing demos; 
similarly, it becomes the common- sensical (and political) view to recognize it.  
 I suggested earlier that Paine both articulates and practices a new mode of political practice 
to go along with his particular political topography. That topographically informed practice 
anticipated and is clarified by Althusser’s work on Machiavelli. In that work, Althusser emphasizes 
how Machiavelli treats his political theory as a mode of political practice: “Machiavelli, who in his 
text elaborated the theory of the means at the disposal of the Prince set to save Italy, treats his own 
text, in its turn and at the same time, as one of those means, making it serve as a means in the struggle he 
announces and engages” (Althusser, 2011: 66, emphasis in the original). The point of political theory 
for the post-1968 Althusser is not to govern practice, or to understand the possibilities of practice in 
general, but for political theory to become a specific modality of political practice itself.  
                                                
16 This might be a ‘feature’ and not a ‘bug’ as Rancière assiduously wants to avoid attaching politics to a pre-
existing subject or a specific location. That said, practice still seems to demand determining what 
subjectification where counts as political. 
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 Part of this reconceptualization of the relationship between practice and theory involves a 
reconceptualization of the relationship between particular and universal. Rather than orient The 
Prince towards a “general knowledge” of politics, Machiavelli is focused instead on a “particular 
political problem” (Althusser, 2011: 16). As Mikko Lahtinen puts it, for Althusser “the individual 
case cannot and should not be subsumed under any general law or theory” (Lahtinen, 2011: 140).  
Machiavelli uses the concept of “fortuna” (‘luck’) to demonstrate the inability of any general theory 
to predict the outcome of politics or govern its practice. That is not to say that Machiavelli eschews 
making any general pronouncements on politics; it is to say that every pronouncement of a general is 
made with an eye to the effects it will have on the particular political situation Machiavelli is 
confronting. 
Paine’s common sense does something close to what Althusser’s Machiavelli does: It casts 
theory as a ‘topographically informed practice’: it calls upon theory to position itself within a specific 
conjuncture and then participate and practice with that positioning in mind. Good political theory, 
from this perspective, is not a representation of politics so much as it is a practical intervention 
within the field of theory, and political theory’s relative ‘goodness’ is determined by the effect that 
intervention has on the particular political context within which it is carried out. Paine’s Common 
Sense is certainly an example of such a theoretical practice. 
However, there is an important contrast between Paine and Althusser. Althusser’s political 
thought involves a commitment to the priority of contingency over necessity: “instead of thinking 
contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as the 
becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies” (Althusser, 2006: 194-5).  Althusser wants to 
be able to think history as sheer contingency, without ascribing any teleological necessity to its 
development. Paine’s Common Sense, on the other hand, emphasizes above all else the necessary 
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victory of America. Paine insists on what Althusser attempts to disavow: he ascribes a necessity to 
history that will lead to a glorious future for America as a free nation. This difference originates in a 
difference between Althusser and Paine’s particular historical and theoretical conjunctures. Althusser 
understands his theory as an intervention in Marxist political philosophy and more specifically as an 
effort to rebut ‘economism’, which Althusser perceived as having rightist implications because of its 
emphasis on historical mechanisms at the expense of political agency. No such opponent exists for 
Paine. Instead, in Paine’s conjuncture it is the seeming impossibility of American victory that makes 
separation from Britain unlikely. If economism means too little doubt that ‘socialism can fail’, then 
Paine’s conjuncture was predominated by too much doubt that America could be victorious. Paine and 
Althusser both develop topographically informed norms of theoretical practice that are sensitive to 
the particular balance of forces in their respective historical situations. As Althusser quoted Lenin, 
Paine is bending the stick back – he is compensating for an overabundance of doubt with an 
abundance of certainty.   
 I have sought to locate Paine’s pamphlet beneath an umbrella of thought I’ve called ‘radical 
democratic.’ This label sits happily with Rancière, who understands himself as advocating a norm 
that equates democracy with the political and is radical insofar as it disassociates democracy from the 
regime of representative liberal democracy. Althusser is a slightly less happy member of this 
coalition: his work belongs to a distinctly Marxist tradition that advocates for a dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Rancière also famously broke with his former teacher Althusser, publishing Althusser’s 
Lesson in the wake of events in Paris in 1968, indicting Althusser as a philosopher of order (Rancière, 
2011). However, what brings these three thinkers together is a shared conceptualization of political 
theory as a specific type of political practice. Political theory is an intervention within theory – 
theory is a specific modality of practice. Rather than seeking to govern practice, theorists need to 
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understand their position within a situation, determine what will make theory effective and then 
practice it. The emphasis on radical disagreement is key to this renovated norm of theory-as-
practice.  Disagreement has ruptured a situation, and for theory to be effective it has to act from 
particularity, without any dream of pre-given consensus and agreement. Paine’s common sense 
approaches politics as constituted by radical disagreement, and then attempts to be practically 
effective within that political space. Paine stages Rancière’s dissensus and dis-identifies America with 
the existing police order. In this sense Paine anticipates contemporary theories of radical democracy: 
democratic because situated on the side of a mass yet to appear; radical because of the demand 
placed upon theory to be practical.  
 
V: Conclusions: Common Sense in the age of Trump?  
 In this paper I have criticized widely accepted notions of common sense that evacuate 
politics of disagreement in the name of Paine’s commons sense, which approaches politics as a 
situation constituted by radical disagreement. Lewis and Clark’s usage of common sense, from which 
this paper began, is paradigmatic of the problems typical of the traditional approach. Their belief 
that common sense refers to a fundamental point of agreement sets them on a fool’s errand 
searching to find the most basic agreement on gun control – what will be ‘common sense’ gun 
control – in the belief that this at least they will share with the Republican opposition. Instead, 
however, they are in a position of radical disagreement with their Republican colleagues. Lewis and 
Clark approach gun control as one right among many the importance of which will be determined 
by its consequences in practice; Republicans approach the issue as a fundamental right that cannot 
be compromised. Further, as Paine found with prejudiced supporters of Britain, Republican 
legislators’ ‘interests’ are actively compromised by National Rifle Association organizing and 
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lobbying efforts (and Democratic legislators are actively compromised by their interest in re-
election). The object of dispute is thus itself in dispute and gun control advocates and their 
opponents do not share a vocabulary with which to discuss the issue. But because Lewis and Clark 
perceive common sense as a point of fundamental agreement that must exist so long as the polity 
exists, and because they understand politics as the business of finding out what everyone can agree 
upon, they end up in a political no man’s land, proposing legislation that not only does not address 
the issue of mass shooting they claim to be motivated to solve, but that fails to resonate with their 
‘base’ and generate grassroots activism and support. 
 If Lewis and Clark adopted Paine’s notion of common sense and attempted to demarcate 
lines of disagreement instead of locating the last shred of agreement, they could enact what I’ve 
called above a topographically informed norm of politics. This would mean working to demarcate 
lines of radical disagreement: they stand for X, we stand for Y, and common sense is only Y, not the 
overlap of X and Y. It also means articulating that line of disagreement in a way such that the 
distinction between X and Y produces the possibility for a new populist mass subject to emerge. 
That does not mean that I think the gun control debate is particularly good terrain for radical 
politics– for one thing, it is an open question whether a radical left committed to empowering the 
people and not the state really wants to centralize the means of violence in the state, and whether 
rural gun ownership contributes to the problem of inner city gun violence Lewis and Clark 
understand themselves to be addressing.  But it does mean that Lewis and Clark’s use of common 
sense is paradigmatic of the problems with the predominant usage of common sense: it is used to 
rule out disagreement rhetorically and thus to obscure the real practice of politics itself. Lewis and 
Clark are doing politics as though the object of debate was pre-given. But, following Rancière, 
30 
politics is precisely the business of establishing what the object of debate will be, and who is entitled 
to debate.  
 In contemporary American politics, the importance of disagreement in political discourse – 
and the importance of simple agreement over the objects of disagreement – has been raised yet 
again. The election of Donald Trump, a far right xenophobe and quasi-fascist figure has been 
surrounded by talk of a ‘post-truth’ world, ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake news.’ Trump’s violations of 
the norms of civility typically expected of public figures, coupled with a far-right posture that speaks 
a misogynistic, racist, anti-scientific and reactionary discourse, seems far out of the norm to many 
Americans17 – we may even be tempted to say Trump is devoid of common sense. 
 Traditional approaches to common sense would then argue for an effort to combat Trump 
by re-finding a lost consensus. On this view, Trump’s lack of common sense suggests that he is out 
of joint with a view that the population already agrees upon. Opposition then should emphasize 
those areas where Trump can be made to appear as exceptionally aberrational, even in comparison 
to past right-wing American governments: his vulgarity, his personal status as a business man, his 
alleged collusion with Putin’s Russian government. Common sense arguments against Trump call 
upon a reservoir of consensuses that Trump is portrayed as violating.  Once we have re-established 
this consensus and limited the transgressions of Trump to deviations from that consensus, we can 
return to politicking as normal. In my view, this is a dangerous tack to take. It suggests that those 
opposing Trump oppose him only because he transgresses norms that the entire community shares. 
On issues where Trump is in line with existing Republican Party orthodoxy – in recent days, his 
decision to bomb Assad government airstrips in Syria – this conception of common sense provides 
                                                
17 Trump’s approval rating, tagged by Gallup at 35% as of 3/31/2017, does not correlate with any of the usual 
predictors of low approval ratings: the economy is healthy, the country is not at war, there hasn’t been a large 
national disaster.  
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the opposition with few tools, and arguments against Trump would lose their claim to being 
common- sensical.  
 An alternative is happily open, however. Instead of understanding the phrase “Donald 
Trump is devoid of common sense” to mean that Trump has violated civil norms widely shared by 
Americans, it can be construed along Paine’s lines to mean that Trump is anti-political in the 
Rancièrean sense. On this view, Trump can be portrayed as a president interested in maintaining a 
police order that prevents those who are unrepresented within it from becoming represented. His 
disagreement with them is radical. The common sense position is to pay attention to the demos’s 
points of rupture – from the Black Lives Matter movement, to Standing Rock, to the surprising 
success of the Bernie Sanders campaign with young and low-income voters. Others who are 
suffering in silence have common sense grievances as well: the trans communities, counties ravaged 
by the opioid crisis, those still without health insurance under the Affordable Care Act. These are all 
groups whose demands are unheard or declared unimportant by the reigning police order. Instead of 
pretending that when we enter the political arena we can finally recover a lost common sense, found 
the community on widely shared foundations and then negotiate as the ‘loyal opposition’ until our 
needs are met, we must admit that we do not agree with the police order, and in fact that we disagree 
so radically with it that it appears to us only as a prejudicial position, while ours is simply common 
sense.  
 This paper is meant to practice this type of resistance. Arguments that Trump has violated 
the social contract may be useful, but it is my intuition that they are only useful insofar as they 
advance one position in a situation constituted by radical disagreement, not because they can 
promise to re-knit consensus about the legitimate foundations of American government. By reading 
Paine as a radical democrat, I hope to intervene in political theory on the grounds that radical 
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disagreement and democratic theory are a part of America’s political inheritance and dis-identify 
Paine with a given police order that currently structures widely held perceptions about the origins of 
the American Revolution. Portraying Paine as a radical democratic populist is also of polemical 
value, and I have both polemicized and theorized in defense of that claim. In short, I have 
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